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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
11 September 1952**

**Problems Raised by Egypt's Military Regime**

General Nagib's assumption of the Egyptian premiership and the arrest of major political and military opposition leaders assure that the army will direct governmental affairs for some time to come.

The army's attention has been focused on the reorganization of the armed forces to strengthen the clique's position. Officers loyal to the old leadership or dissatisfied with the new have been retired. The army reported that it had anticipated and foiled two or three counter-coups.

The intensity of anti-corruption sentiment in the clique and civilian failure to put through the demanded reforms made the army's intervention in civil affairs inevitable. The deciding factor which caused the army to force Ali Maher's resignation was the fear that the failure of the government and the political parties to begin adequate reforms would undermine the position of the army leaders themselves.

The extreme nationalism of the new government is reflected by its appointment of an orthodox Moslem army officer to the Regency Council. Two important cabinet appointees are members of the anti-British Nationalist Party. A third is a member of the inner circle of the Moslem Brotherhood.

The quick arrest or house detention of top Wafd leaders, as well as officials of other parties, eliminated an incipient political threat to the military leadership. The government's subsequent ultimatum to Egyptian political parties to eliminate corruption within 30 days is further evidence that the army will allow no interference. It climaxed the political purge on 11 September by dissolving the once-impregnable Wafd.

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The army can probably reform Egypt's politics, but its drastic economic program offers serious problems. The threatened division of large estates may undermine Egypt's ability to compete in world markets for cotton, its chief product.

General Nagib and his associates have shown a friendly attitude toward the United States, but little interest in talking with Great Britain. The nationalist, anti-British stand of several important figures and the removal of many pre-Western officials from power suggest that the present regime's policy toward Britain, MEDO, and Israel may be no less intransigent than that of former governments. Repercussions already evident in other Arab nations like Lebanon indicate that Nagib's success or failure in maintaining his position and enforcing his reforms will have influence on the entire Arab world.

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